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M  E  X  I  C  O GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION
HELIOS HERRERA AND C￿SAR MARTINELLI
Abstract. We present a model of participation in large elec-
tions with endogenous formation of voter groups. Citizens de-
cide whether to be followers or become leaders (activists) and try
to bring other citizens to vote for their preferred party. In the
(unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of leaders favoring
each party is a function of the cost of activism and the import-
ance of the election. Expected turnout and winning margin in the
election are, in turn, a function of the number of leaders and the
strength of social interactions. The model predicts a non mono-
tonic relationship between expected turnout and winning margin
in large elections.
Keywords: Voter￿ s Paradox, Endogenous Leaders, Turnout, Win-
ning Margin. JEL D72.
￿Si nos habitudes naissent de nos propres sentiments dans la retraite,
elles naissent de l￿ opinion d￿ autrui dans la sociØtØ. Quand on ne vit pas
en soi mais dans les autres, ce sont leurs jugements qui rŁglent tout ...￿
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettre ￿ M. d￿ Alembert (1758)
￿Most people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else￿ s
opinions, their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation.￿
Oscar Wilde, De Profundis (1905)
1. Introduction
The decision to cast a vote in a large election, it has been observed,
is strongly correlated with indicators of how well integrated is the in-
dividual in society. Empirical research on the US and other countries
has found that the better educated, the eldest, the most religious, the
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married, and the less mobile are more likely to vote.
1 The decision to
cast a vote, it has also been observed, has a weak relation with the
individual cost and bene￿t of voting, if the bene￿t is proportional to
the likelihood of a single vote deciding the election. Election closeness
is correlated with aggregate turnout in di⁄erent countries, but the re-
lationship completely or almost completely vanishes at the individual
level, especially if direct measures of the probability of casting a decis-
ive vote are employed.
2 And variations in the cost of voting due to, say,
weather conditions, have been shown to be of marginal signi￿cance.
3
Overall, the evidence suggests that in order to account for voluntary
participation in large elections we must look beyond the individual
voters to include in the picture the groups they belong to. This is,
perhaps, unsurprising. If voters are motivated only by the e⁄ect of
their actions in the result of the election, and there is but a slight cost
involved in the act of voting, game-theoretic models predict a dismally
low turnout, as long as voters are somewhat uncertain about the pref-
erences of others ￿a prediction clearly at odds with mass participation
in elections.
4 Thus, for empirical and theoretical reasons, attention has
turn to modelling participation in elections as a group activity.
The earliest group-based models of electoral turnout (e.g. Uhlaner
[23] and Morton [15]) e⁄ectively substitute a game between relatively
few players (groups or rather their leaders) for a game between many
players (voters at large). Early models emphasize either side-payments,
social pressure, or ￿group identity￿as explanations of why individual
voters would follow the group leaders. More recently, Feddersen and
Sandroni [7], following Harsanyi [9], have proposed an ethical theory
of group behavior in elections. (See also Coate and Conlin [4] for a
di⁄erent take on the same proposal.)
Group-based models of turnout proposed so far have in common the
idea that the electorate is divided into distinct, prearranged groups.
In this paper we attempt to explain how the electorate is divided in
1The landmark study of Wol￿nger and Rosenstone [24] in the US shows the
importance of education, age, marriage and mobility. The recent study by Blais [3]
in nine democratic countries, including the US, maintains education and age at the
top of the list and adds religiosity, income and marriage.
2Matsusaka and Palda [14] and Matsusaka [12] provide evidence of the insens-
itivity of individual voters to election closeness. Blais [3] provides evidence of a
marginal e⁄ect of closeness and of no e⁄ect of direct measures of the probability of
casting a decisive vote.
3Knack [10] shows that the impact of rain on turnout in the US is minimal. See
again the excellent discussion in Blais [3].
4See e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal [18, 19], who build on earlier work by Ledyard
[11]. An elegant treatment of the subject is provided by Myerson [16].GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 3
groups and what are the implications for electoral participation in large
elections. We propose a model in which there is a continuum of citizens
distributed uniformly over a circle. Citizens must decide whether to
become leaders, and mobilize groups of voters in support of the leader￿ s
preferred candidate in an election, or remain as followers. If a citizen
becomes a leader, the citizen is assigned an interval of in￿ uence in the
circle. The length of the in￿ uence interval of each leader is random and
depends on the number of other leaders and possibly on some exogen-
ous breaks in the circle, representing weak spots in social interactions.
Leaders are able to sway citizens in their interval of in￿ uence to the
voting booth. Becoming a leader is costly, but carries the potential
bene￿t of swinging the election in the direction favored by the leader.
The model has a unique pure strategy equilibrium, described by a
simple formula comparing the probability of a marginal leader being
decisive with the cost/bene￿t ratio of political activism. This in itself
is noteworthy since, as stated in a recent survey by Feddersen [6], ex-
istence of equilibria has been a central problem for group-based models
of turnout. After showing the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium,
we analyze the e⁄ects of changes in the parameters of the model on
the endogenous variables, namely the expected turnout and the ex-
pected margin of victory in the election. As expected, a reduction in
the cost/bene￿t ratio of activism, by increasing the number of leaders
for each party, results in a larger expected turnout. More surprisingly,
reductions in the cost/bene￿t ratio of activism have non monotonic
e⁄ects on the expected margin of victory. Increasing the number of
leaders for each party increases the expected winning margin if expec-
ted turnout is below 50% and decreases the expected winning margin if
expected turnout is above 50%. As a result, the relationship between
the winning margin and turnout is non monotonic. For commonly
observed turnout levels, though, the model predicts a positive associ-
ation between turnout and election closeness, in accordance with the
evidence.
For relatively low cost/bene￿t ratios of activism, that is when there
are many leaders in equilibrium, it is possible to relate the parameters
of the model quite precisely to the ￿observable￿ variables, winning
margin and turnout. We illustrate this using data from US presidential
elections before and after the well-known fall in turnout in the sixties
and seventies. Of course, this is a just a suggestive exercise, meant to
show the advantage of having at least a simple, highly stylized model
to help make sense of the data.
Our model has some resemblance to the citizen-candidate models
pioneered by Osborne and Slivinsky [17] and Besley and Coate [2]. WeGROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 4
have in common with that literature the idea of endogenizing political
activism. The type of political activism we try to capture in our model
is radically di⁄erent, however. In that literature, political activists are
candidates themselves. The issue of turnout is not addressed and the
focus is on candidate platforms and party formation. By contrast, we
take party platforms as given and focus on the issue of turnout. In
our model, political activists are not candidates themselves; rather,
they are citizens interested in in￿ uencing the election outcome. We
can also compare our model with the work on voter mobilization by
Shachar and Nalebu⁄ [22]. In our model, as opposed to Shachar and
Nalebu⁄￿ s, leaders are not exogenously given. The margin of analysis
we focus on is that of the decision to in￿ uence others, rather than the
e⁄ort invested in in￿ uencing others.
Our work is also related to the social interactions literature pion-
eered, inter alia, by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman [8].
5 We bor-
row from Glaeser et al. the arrangement of agents in a circle and the
idea that some agents imitate their group behavior while others act
independently, depending on their voting cost. We deviate in that the
number of agents that act as leaders is derived endogenously in the
model. When the costs and bene￿ts of an activity, such as casting a
vote or issuing an opinion, are very low, most people may be content
to follow the lead of a few, as expressed, perhaps not without certain
pessimism, by Rousseau and Wilde in our introductory quotations.
2. The Model
We consider an election with two alternatives or parties, A and
B. There is a continuum of citizens with measure one. A (positive
measure) subset of citizens are A-partisans, another (positive measure)
subset of citizens B-partisans, and the remainder are non-partisans.
Partisans enjoy a net gain of G > 0 if their preferred party wins the
election, while non-partisans are indi⁄erent with respect to the result
of the election.
Citizens make decisions in three stages. In the ￿rst stage, every
citizen chooses whether to become an active supporter of a party or
not. We refer to an active supporter as an opinion leader, and to a
citizen who is not an active supporter as a follower. Becoming a leader
in favor of one party or the other involves a utility cost c > 0. In
the second stage, followers are assigned to one of the leaders or to no
leader at all, according to a random process that is described in detail
5See Becker and Murphy [1] and Durlauf and Young [5] for more recent
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below. Followers under the range of in￿ uence of some leader are o⁄ered
by their leader a compensation of v + " in exchange for committing to
vote for the party of that leader, where " is arbitrarily small. These
followers have the option of accepting this compensation, or rejecting
it. In case of rejection, they receive no compensation but are free to
abstain or vote for who they want, just like the followers who are not
assigned to any leader. In the third stage, every citizen decides whether
to vote for one party or abstain. Voting involves a cost v > 0, while
abstaining involves no cost. The party favored by the larger fraction
of votes wins the election; if both parties receive the same measure of
votes, there is a tie and it is resolved by a fair coin toss.
The fraction of followers that a given leader gets assigned in the
second stage of the game is random and depends negatively on how
many other citizens become leaders. We assume that leaders are dropped
uniformly on a circle of measure one, which represents the population of
citizens. A ￿xed number of exogenous interruptions O is also dropped
uniformly on the circle. Each leader gets assigned the interval of cit-
izens of agents to the right of the leader, until the interval is interrupted
by another leader or by an exogenous interruption. The inverse of the
number of exogenous interruptions is meant to represent the strength
of social interactions. When social interactions are strong, the in￿ u-
ence of an opinion leader is likely to extend over the circle representing
society until it is contested by some other opinion leader. Per contra,
when social interactions are weak, the in￿ uence of an opinion leader is
likely to die out at some point even before it is contested. The assump-
tion that the number of exogenous interruptions is ￿xed is done only
for simplicity; as will be explained later on (in Section 5), our results
hold if the number of exogenous interruptions is random.
It is easy to check that best response behavior implies that uncom-
mitted citizens or citizens who are not assigned to any leader will ab-
stain in the third stage of the game. Moreover, citizens under the
in￿ uence of one leader in the second stage of the game will always
commit to vote for the party of that leader. With respect to leaders,
we can assume that they have to commit to vote for the party they
support, so that the cost of becoming a leader includes the cost of vot-
ing. (This assumption is really unnecessary since in equilibrium there
will be only a ￿nite ￿i.e. measure zero ￿set of leaders in favor of either
party.) Note that if no citizen volunteers to become a leader in the ￿rst
stage of the game, all citizens remain uncommitted in the third stage.
In that case, since the in￿ uence of a single vote is negligible, no one
shows up to vote and there is a tied election.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 6
It is also easy to check that only A-partisans will want to become
leaders in favor of party A, and similarly for B. Let LA and LB rep-
resent the (￿nite) number of A and B-partisans that become leaders.
Using the model, we can calculate the probability that A wins the
election, say P(LA;LB). De￿ne
PA(LA;LB) = P(LA;LB) ￿ P(LA ￿ 1;LB);
PB(LA;LB) = P(LA;LB ￿ 1) ￿ P(LA;LB)
as the probabilities that a leader for A and for B, respectively, are
decisive in favor of their party. We refer to these probabilities as decis-
iveness in favor of A and decisiveness in favor of B, respectively, with
the mention of the party suppressed in symmetric situations.
For LA or LB (countably or uncountably) in￿nite, we simply assume
that the probability of being decisive is zero. This guarantees that
there is no equilibrium in which more than a ￿nite number of citizens
become leaders.

























B) > c=G if L
￿
B ￿ 1:
The strict inequalities in the de￿nition are due to the fact that if
either L￿
A or L￿
B is positive, a citizen who remains a follower makes a
(small) utility gain " with positive probability.
Note that the de￿nition of equilibrium makes no reference to the
identities of the partisans who become leaders; that is, we make no
distinction between any two situations in which di⁄erent citizens be-
come leaders, as long as the number of leaders for each party remains
constant.
Our de￿nition of equilibrium is restricted to pure strategy equilibria,
even though it is possible to show that our model admits some mixed
strategy equilibria. As pointed out by Feddersen [6], the interpretation
of mixed strategy equilibria presents conceptual problems in group-
based models. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, partisan citizens who
become leaders are supposed to start conveying instructions to followers
without being overheard by other potential leaders.
We describe the equilibria of the model in the next section.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 7
3. Decisiveness and Equilibrium
We have
Theorem 1. There is a unique equilibrium. If c=G < 1=2, in equilib-
rium L￿
A = L￿





(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!
> c=G:
If c=G ￿ 1=2, L￿
A = L￿
B = 0. Moreover, if c=G < 1=2, the expected




and the expected winning margin (the di⁄erence in the fraction of votes














(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!
represents decisiveness when there are L leaders for each party. Note
that this expression is strictly decreasing in L, and takes the value 1=2
when L = 1. Note also that decisiveness approaches asymptotically
(using the Stirling formula) 1=
p
4￿ (L ￿ 1). Since this last expression
declines relatively slowly with L, the equilibrium number of leaders is
not necessarily small.
The absence of asymmetric equilibria is due to the symmetry prop-
erty of decisiveness, as described below. Intuitively, if a party has more
leaders than the other party, and their partisans have no incentive to
deviate increasing or decreasing the number of their leaders, then ne-
cessarily some partisan of the party in the minority has incentives to
become an additional leader.
Before the proof of the theorem, we state a series of lemmas that are
proved in the Appendix.
First, we consider the question of how a given number of leaders for
each party LA;LB maps into the distribution of votes.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 8
Lemma 1. If LA, LB and O are positive, the joint probability density
function of the fraction of votes a for party A and b for party B is
hLA;LB (a;b) =
(LA + LB + O ￿ 1)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
a
LA￿1b
LB￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1
for 0 ￿ a + b ￿ 1.





(LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!
a
LA￿1 (1 ￿ a)
LB￿1
for 0 ￿ a ￿ 1, with b = 1 ￿ a.
Lemma 1 establishes that the joint distribution of the fraction of
votes going to party A and to party B is equal to the joint distribution
of the LA-th order statistic and the di⁄erence between the (LA + LB)-
th and the LA-th order statistic of a sample of size LA + LB + O ￿ 1
drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval.6 The idea
of the proof is the following. We can pick the location in the circle of
any leader for party A and consider that location point 0 (from the
left) and point 1 (from the right). Thus, the remainder of leaders and
exogenous breaks is a uniform sample of size LA +LB +O ￿1. Due to
a symmetry property of uniform order statistics, we can calculate the
fraction of votes for A and for B as if all the remaining leaders for A
would come ￿rst in the unit interval, and all the leaders for B would
come next.
Next, we calculate the probability that party A wins the election
using the distributions described by Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. If LA and LB are positive, the probability of party A win-
ning the election is






￿LA+LB￿1 (LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA + k ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
:
Note that the probability of party A winning the election is inde-
pendent of the number of exogenous interruptions. Following the line
of the previous intuitive argument, the probability that the LA-th order
6We follow the convention of naming the smallest element in the sample the
￿rst-order statistic, and so on.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 9
statistic is larger than the di⁄erence between the (LA+LB)-th and the
LB-th order statistic is independent of the size of the sample.
Next, we use Lemma 2 to calculate the decisiveness in favor of A.





(LA + LB ￿ 2)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!
:
The expression for decisiveness provided by Lemma 3 is exceedingly
simple and plays a key role in the proof of the theorem.
Finally, we derive some useful properties of decisiveness from the
expression above.
Lemma 4. If LA and LB are positive, decisiveness satis￿es the follow-
ing properties:
(i) (near single-peakedness)
PA(LA;LB) R PA(LA + 1;LB) () LA + 1 R LB:
(ii) (symmetry)
PA(LA;LB) = PA(LB;LA) = PB(LB;LA):
Lemma 4 establishes, in particular, that decisiveness in favor of a
party achieves its maximum value when this party has either the same
number of leaders than the other party or one fewer leader.
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Using the equilibrium conditions, any equilibrium
L￿
A;L￿
B with a positive number of leaders for party A and for party B







































Using near single-peakedness (Lemma 4i), we get
L
￿












B:GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 10
Thus, any equilibrium with a positive number of leaders for party A
and for party B must be such that L￿
A = L￿
B = L￿, where L￿ satis￿es
PA(L
￿;L
￿) > c=G ￿ PA(L
￿ + 1;L
￿):
Using symmetry, this condition is equivalent to
PA(L
￿;L
￿) > c=G ￿ PA(L
￿;L
￿ + 1):




￿) > c=G ￿ PA(L
￿ + 1;L
￿ + 1):





(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!
:
Note that this expression is strictly decreasing in L and it takes the
value 1=2 when L = 1. Thus, there are equilibria with a positive
number of leaders for party A and for party B if and only if c=G < 1=2,
and they are as described by the statement of the theorem.
Consider now an equilibrium in which there is a positive number L￿
A
of leaders for party A and no leaders for party B. The equilibrium
conditions are
PA(L￿




Recall that if both parties receive the same fraction of votes, the elec-
tion is resolved by a fair coin toss. Since neither party receives votes
when there are no leaders, we have P(0;0) = 1=2. Since only party
A receives a positive fraction of votes when L￿
A is positive and L￿
B
is zero, we have P(L￿
A;0) = 1 for L￿
A ￿ 1. Thus, PA(1;0) = 1=2
and PA(L￿
A;0) = 0 for L￿
A ￿ 2. Using the ￿rst equilibrium condi-
tion above, we get L￿
A = 1. From symmetry and Lemma 3, we get
PB(1;1) = PA(1;1) = 1=2. Thus, for L￿
A = 1 the ￿rst equilibrium
above implies 1=2 > c=G and the second equilibrium condition implies
c=G ￿ 1=2, a contradiction. It follows that there are no equilibria in
which only party A obtains a positive number of leaders. A similar
argument shows that there are no equilibria in which only party B
obtains a positive number of leaders.
Consider, ￿nally, an equilibrium in which neither party obtains a
positive number of leaders. The equilibrium conditions are
c=G ￿ PA(1;0);
c=G ￿ PB(0;1):GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 11
We established in the previous paragraph that PA(1;0) = 1=2. A sim-
ilar argument shows that PB(0;1) = 1=2. Thus, there is an equilibrium
in which neither party obtains a positive number of leaders if and only
if c=G ￿ 1=2.
For the remainder of the proof we assume that there is a positive
number of leaders L for each party. With respect to voter participation,
for O = 0 it is easy to see that turnout is one, as results from the
formula provided in the statement of the theorem. For O ￿ 1, we have
that the expected turnout in equilibrium is





(a + b)hL;L (a;b) dbda:
Using Lemma 1,
E(a + b) =
(2L + O ￿ 1)!








L￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1 dbda:
Or equivalently,
E(a + b) =
(2L + O ￿ 1)!









L￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1 + a
L￿1b




Using Lemma 1 again,
E(a + b) =
(2L + O ￿ 1)!
(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
￿















Since hL+1;L(a;b) and hL;L+1(a;b) are bivariate probability density func-
tions with support 0 ￿ a + b ￿ 1, we get
E(a + b) =
(2L + O ￿ 1)!
(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
￿
(L ￿ 1)!L!(O ￿ 1)!
(2L + O)!
￿ 2:
The result on turnout in the statement of the theorem follows.
With respect to the closeness of the election, suppose that O ￿ 1.
(The proof for O = 0 is similar.) Using Lemma 1, the expected winningGROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 12
margin is






(a ￿ b)hL;L (a;b) dbda
=
2(2L + O ￿ 1)!








L￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1 dbda
=
2(2L + O ￿ 1)!

















Using Lemma 1 again,
E(ja ￿ bj) =
2(2L + O ￿ 1)!
(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
￿
























E(ja ￿ bj) =
2L
2L + O
(P(L + 1;L) ￿ P(L;L + 1)):
Using the de￿nitions of decisiveness in favor of A and B and symmetry
(Lemma 4ii),
E(ja ￿ bj) =
2L
2L + O
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Using Lemma 3,










as stated by the theorem. ￿
4. Turnout and Winning Margin
In this section we analyze the relation between the parameters of the
model, namely the cost/bene￿t ratio of political activism (c=G) and the
strength of social interactions (1=O), and the endogenous, observable
variables of the model, namely the expected turnout and the expected
winning margin.
4.1. Comparative Statics. Theorem 1 calculates the equilibriumnum-
ber of leaders for each party as a (decreasing) function of the cost/bene￿t
ratio of activism. The e⁄ect of changes in the cost/bene￿t ratio of activ-
ism and the strength of social interactions on the equilibrium expected
turnout follows immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. A reduction in the cost/bene￿t ratio of activism (weakly)
increases the expected turnout. An increase in the strength of social in-
teractions increases the expected turnout and reduces the expected win-
ning margin.
While the e⁄ect of the cost/bene￿t ratio of activism on electoral
turnout is unambiguous, its e⁄ect on the expected closeness of the
election is more complex.
Corollary 2. If a reduction in the cost/bene￿t ratio of activism leads
to an increase in one in the number of leaders for each party, then the
expected winning margin decreases if and only if initially the expected
turnout is above 1/2 and it increases if and only if initially the expected
winning margin is below 1/2.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we have that the expected winning margin
with L + 1 leaders is
L + 1





(L + 1)!(L + 1)!
￿
;
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The ratio of these two expressions is
1 + 1=(2L)
1 + 1=(L + O=2)
;
which is smaller than one if and only if O < 2L (or equivalently, if and
only if expected turnout is smaller than 1/2) and is larger than one if
and only if O > 2L. ￿
Intuitively, if the fraction of voters is smaller in expectation than
the fraction of abstainers, then extra leaders are more likely to bring
abstainers to vote rather than to steal voters from other leaders, thereby
increasing the variance of the di⁄erence of votes between the two parties.
If, instead, the fraction of voters is larger in expectation than the frac-
tion of abstainers, then new leaders tend to steal voters from each other
rather than bringing abstainers to vote, thereby reducing the variance
of the di⁄erence of votes.
Let ET be the expected turnout and EW be the expected winning
margin. Using Theorem 1, we can obtain an approximation for the
parameters of the model when there are many activists (that is, when
the cost/bene￿t ratio of activism is small):









(See the proof in the Appendix.) We use these expressions in the
context of a discussion about empirical evidence below.
4.2. Empirical Evidence. Average turnout in elections for national-
level o¢ ce in most democracies is above 50% (see e.g. Blais [3]).
In those circumstances, our model predicts that movements in the
cost/bene￿t ratio of activism lead to movements with the same sign
in the winning margin. If, as seems likely, costs and bene￿ts of activ-
ism experience more short term variations than the strength of social
interactions, we should expect to see a negative short term correlation
between winning margin and turnout. Long term trends in turnout,
however, are likely to be a⁄ected by trends in both the cost/bene￿t
ratio of activism and the strength of social interactions.
The relation between winning margin (or rather, election closeness)
and turnout has been the subject of an empirical literature reviewed
recently by Blais [3]. In this author￿ s words,
[...] the verdict is crystal clear with respect to closeness:
closeness has been found to increase turnout in 27 outGROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 15
of the 32 studies that have tested the relationship, in
many di⁄erent settings and with diverse methodologies.
([3], p. 60)
Blais goes on to state that the importance of closeness is not captured
by direct measures of the (very small) probability of a single vote being
decisive.
[...] what a⁄ects the voting decision is not [...] the
strict probability that the individual could cast a decis-
ive vote, but rather the probability that the outcome
could be decided by a relatively small number of votes.
([3], p. 139)
Closeness remains statistically signi￿cant even controlling for party
spending ([3], p. 62), which is at least consistent with decentralized,
group-based models of turnout such as ours.
Figure 1 provides some data from US presidential elections since
1948. Turnout is de￿ned as the total of valid popular votes casted in
the election as a percentage of the voting age population. Winning
margin is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the votes received by the
winning presidential candidate and the votes received by the second
presidential candidate, as a percentage of the voting age population.
Of course, presidential elections in the US are decided by the electoral
college and not by the popular vote, so that the ￿winning margin￿
may in fact be negative, as it happened (barely) in the 2000 election.
Although there seems to be some negative correlation between turnout
and winning margin from 1976 on, the most salient feature of the data
is the dramatic fall in turnout in the late sixties and early seventies,
accompanied by a decrease in the winning margin. For the period 1952-
1972, the average turnout is 60.66% and the average winning margin
is 7.23%. The corresponding numbers for 1976-2004 are, respectively,
53.03% and 3.51%.
Matsusaka [13] discusses some of the literature dealing with the de-
cline in turnout in the US. Matsusaka contends that demographic and
legal changes alone do not explain the fall in turnout, and instead
proposes that the decline in party identi￿cation rendered voters less
capable of making an informed decision at the voting booth. A simple
calculation using Corollary 3 suggests that the cost/bene￿t ratio of
political activism fell from about 0.060 to 0.033 during the early 1970s,
while at the same time the social interactions term fell from about 0.034
to 0.008. That is, perhaps in agreement with Matsusaka￿ s contention,
society become more fragmented even as barriers to political activity
were lowered.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 16
Figure 1:  Turnout and Winnin Margin
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5. Extensions
Randomness in the number of exogenous interruptions in the circle is
easily incorporated into the model. Though the model assumes ex-ante
identical agents except for their party preferences, it can be extended to
allow for heterogeneous voting costs and cost/bene￿t ratios of activism
under some conditions.
5.1. Random Interruptions. Assume that the number of exogenous
interruptions in the circle is a random variable ~ O with bounded support
whose realization is not known by partisan citizens at the moment of
deciding whether to become leaders or not. For any given number
of leaders for party A and for party B, the probability of party A
winning the election is the same regardless of the realization of ~ O and
is given by Lemma 2. Thus, the decisiveness in favor of A is as given by
Lemma 3 and therefore the equilibrium number of leaders is as given
by Theorem 1. Expected turnout is now the expectation (conditional
on the realization of ~ O) of the expression for turnout in Theorem 1,
and similarly for expected winning margin.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 17
5.2. Heterogeneous Voting Costs. Assume that voting costs are
heterogeneous across citizens and distributed according to some con-
tinuous probability density with support bounded away from zero, and
that the ￿xed compensation o⁄ered by opinion leaders to voters is lar-
ger than the lower endpoint in the support of the density. In this case,
followers who are not assigned to any leader still abstain, and follow-
ers who are assigned to a leader commit to vote as long as the (￿xed)
compensation o⁄ered by the leader is larger than their idiosyncratic
voting cost. As a result, the decisiveness calculation of leaders is the
same and so is their equilibrium number of leaders. Note that the cit-
izens with low voting cost that become followers assigned to a leader
may obtain a positive net bene￿t from voting. This raises their ex-
pected reservation value from being followers and biases the ￿rst stage
leader-follower decision towards being followers. Citizens with low vot-
ing costs are more likely to be followers than leaders, unless we assume
that leaders reward themselves too for voting. In either case these
di⁄erent reservation values do not change the results.
5.3. Heterogeneous Leadership Costs. Assume that the cost of
activism (or equivalently, the importance of the election) is hetero-
geneous across citizens and distributed according to come continuous
probability density with lower endpoint of the support c > 0. Recall
that the decision to become a leader depends on the decisiveness cost-
bene￿t calculation. The equilibrium number of leaders L￿ will be given
by the largest integer solution to the inequality
PA (L;L) > c=G:
There is really no di⁄erence with the homogeneous case. There may
be some ine¢ ciency, though, since the leaders in equilibrium are not
necessarily the citizens with lower costs. This is due to the discrete
nature of the number of leaders. Only the citizens with cost/bene￿t
ratio smaller than PA (L￿;L￿) may become leaders in this heterogeneous
case.
5.4. Di⁄erent E⁄ectiveness of Leaders. We assumed so far that
the interval of in￿ uence or cluster of a leader was random but the ef-
fectiveness of the leaders of each party was the same. That is, we
assumed the leader could attract all the agents in the leader￿ s interval
of in￿ uence to vote for his party. More generally, we can assume that
leaders of party A and party B can attract only a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1]
and ￿ 2 (0;1], respectively, of the potential voters of their interval of
in￿ uence. This setup is general and allows for proportions ￿ and ￿ toGROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 18
depend on the original preferences of the voters (provided that the pro-
portions of A-partisans and B-partisans are the same in each interval).
For instance, a leader for party A could attract all A-partisans and
none of the B-partisans. For ￿ = ￿, the equilibrium number of lead-
ers of the model is the one we previously obtained: only the turnout
should be scaled down accordingly if ￿ = ￿ < 1. If ￿ 6= ￿, then the
equilibrium is no longer necessarily symmetric. To extend the model
we need to recalculate the decisiveness in favor of A and B.
Lemma 5. Let ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿). If LA and LB are positive, the decis-
iveness in favor of A and B are, respectively,
PA(LA;LB) = (1 ￿ ￿)
LA￿1 ￿
LB (LA + LB ￿ 2)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!
and
PB(LA;LB) = ((1 ￿ ￿)
LA ￿
LB￿1 (LA + LB ￿ 2)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!
:
(See the proof in the Appendix.)
The constant ratio of decisiveness
PB (LA;LB)=PA (LA;LB) = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ = ￿=￿
is an indicator of the advantage of B relative to A. We can easily check
PA (LA;LB) R PA (LA ￿ 1;LB) () (LA ￿ 1) Q (￿=￿)(LB ￿ 1)
and
PB (LA;LB) R PB (LA;LB ￿ 1) () (LA ￿ 1) R (￿=￿)(LB ￿ 1):
That is, both decisiveness in favor of A and decisiveness in favor of B
















￿ PB(LA;LB + 1)
must be satis￿ed simultaneously, which implies that decisiveness must
be at its peak. Note that for decisiveness to be at its peak, the party
at disadvantage must have more leaders than the other party. That is,
decisiveness peaks when the probabilities of winning the election are
near 50%.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 19
Existence of pure strategy equilibria becomes an issue when lead-
ers have di⁄erent e⁄ectiveness. If, for instance, ￿=￿ is not rational,
then there is no equilibrium for c=G < 1=2, since the condition (LA ￿
1)=(LB ￿1) = ￿=￿ cannot be satis￿ed. However, it can be shown that
there are almost pure strategy equilibria in which only one potential
leader per party randomizes between becoming a leader or not.
6. Final Remarks
There is no generally accepted model of such pervasive social phe-
nomenon as massive voluntary participation in large elections. As poin-
ted out in a recent survey article by Feddersen [6], the literature ap-
pears to be converging toward a group-based model of turnout, in which
members participate in elections because they are directly coordinated
and rewarded by leaders. This paper is intended to be a contribution
to the literature on groups in elections. We treat all citizens as ex
ante identical (except with respect to their political inclination) and
have leaders self-selecting endogenously out of this homogeneous pop-
ulation. Thus, at the substantive level, our model sheds some light
on how groups of voters can be formed out of the general population,
and how voting behavior is a⁄ected by the underlying parameters of
the model, namely the cost of political activism, the importance of the
election and the strength or weakness of social interactions, even if the
vast majority of voters do not behave strategically at the ballot.
We carry out the analysis in a highly stylized environment. At the
technical level, we are able to obtain an attractive closed form ex-
pression for the equilibrium of the model. The equilibrium pins down
uniquely the number of leaders for each party, the expected turnout,
and the closeness of the election. We carry out comparative statics
exercises, obtaining intuitive results with respect to expected turnout,
and some unexpected results with respect to the expected winning
margin. The fact that we deal successfully with issues of existence and
uniqueness of pure strategy equilibria is, we believe, an encouraging
step in the direction of a satisfactory group-based model of elections.
We believe our model is ￿ exible enough to be extended in a number
of dimensions beyond those discussed in the previous section. The ver-
sion of the model with di⁄erent e⁄ectiveness of leaders may be useful
as a building block to incorporate variable e⁄ort of leaders. Though
we focus on policy motivated leaders, incorporating a private interest
for leaders ￿e.g. a reward from the party proportional to the frac-
tion of voters carried to the voting booth ￿is clearly feasible. OtherGROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 20
extensions that may be of interest are allowing leaders to have overlap-
ping intervals of in￿ uence and considering elections with three or more
candidates.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 21
Appendix: Proofs
Before proving Lemma 1 we need some statistical results. Let n+1 =
LA + LB + O be the total number of leaders and exogenous interrup-
tions that are distributed uniformly on the circle. Pick any leader
or exogenous interruption and call that point 0 (from the right) and
1 (from the left). From 0 to 1 (going to the right) the remaining
n leaders and exogenous interruptions are distributed uniformly. Let
y1;:::;yn (with y1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ yn) represent the (random) location of these
points. Then the interval of in￿ uence of each leader or interruption is
x1 = y1;:::;xk = yk ￿ yk￿1;:::;xn+1 = 1 ￿ yn.
Theorem A.1. The joint distribution of the intervals
(x1 = y1;:::;xk = yk ￿ yk￿1;:::;xn+1 = 1 ￿ yn)
of the uniform order statistic 0 ￿ y1 < y2 < ￿￿￿ < yn ￿ 1 is invariant
under the permutation of its components.
Proof. See Reiss [21], p. 40. ￿
This implies, in particular,
Corollary A.1. All marginal distributions of (x1;:::;xk;:::;xn+1) of
equal dimension are equal.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given a sample size n, the joint density function of




(i ￿ 1)!(j ￿ i ￿ 1)!(n ￿ j)!
(ai)
i￿1 (aj ￿ ai)
j￿i￿1 (1 ￿ aj)
n￿j
for 0 ￿ ai < aj ￿ 1. Reordering the intervals of in￿ uence (see Corollary
A.1) so that all the A leaders come ￿rst and then all the B leaders come
next, and letting LA = i, LA+LB = j, LA+LB+O = n+1, a = ai and
b = aj ￿ ai, we get the bivariate distribution of a and b when O ￿ 1.
Similarly, the density function of an order statistic for a uniform
underlying distribution on the unit interval is
f (ai) =
n!
(i ￿ 1)!(n ￿ i)!
(ai)
i￿1 (1 ￿ ai)
n￿i
for 0 ￿ ai ￿ 1. Reordering the intervals of in￿ uence so that there are
￿rst A leaders then B leaders, and letting LA = i, LA + LB = n + 1
and a = ai, we get the distribution of a when O = 0. ￿GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 22
Before proving Lemmas 2 to 5, we need a couple of hypergeometric
identities.7




M+N￿k (M + N ￿ k ￿ 1)!






N￿k (M + N ￿ 1)!
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k)!
:
Proof. We proceed by induction. For any positive M, the equality is
easily shown to be satis￿ed for N = 1. We claim that if the equality
is satis￿ed for N ￿ 1, then it is satis￿ed for N, for any N ￿ 2. To see





M+N￿k (M + N ￿ k ￿ 1)!





M+N￿1￿k (M + N ￿ k ￿ 2)!
(M ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1 ￿ k)!
= (1 ￿ d)
M+N￿1 (M + N ￿ 2)!
(M ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1)!
:
Similarly, evaluate the expression in the right-hand side at N and at





N￿k (M + N ￿ 1)!






N￿k￿1 (M + N ￿ 2)!
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1 ￿ k)!
= (1 ￿ d)




7We are very grateful to Aaron Robertson for explaining to us the Wilf-Zeilberger
method [20] to solve hypergeometric identities.GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 23
where
H(k) =
(1 ￿ d)k￿NdN￿k(M + N ￿ 1)
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k)!
￿
(1 ￿ d)k￿NdN￿k￿1
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k ￿ 1)!
=
(1 ￿ d)k￿NdN￿k(M + N ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ d)k￿NdN￿k￿1(N ￿ k)
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k)!
=
(1 ￿ d)k￿NdN￿k(M + k ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ d)k+1￿NdN￿k￿1(N ￿ k)
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k)!
=
(1 ￿ d)k￿NdN￿k
(M + k ￿ 2)!(N ￿ k)!
￿
(1 ￿ d)k+1￿NdN￿k￿1
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k ￿ 1)!
:
for k = 1;:::;N ￿ 1 and
H(N) =
1





(M + k ￿ 2)!(N ￿ k)!
:




H(k) = J(1) =
1
(M ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1)!
:
It follows that the di⁄erence between the expression in the right-hand
side evaluated at N and at N ￿ 1 is also equal to
(1 ￿ d)
M+N￿1 (M + N ￿ 2)!
(M ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1)!
:
￿
Lemma A.2. For all M 2 N, N 2 N and d 2 (0;1),
N X
k=1
(M + N ￿ 2)!







(M + N ￿ 1)!




= (1 ￿ d)
M￿1 d
N (M + N ￿ 2)!
(M ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1)!




(M + N ￿ 2)!







(M + N ￿ 1)!




= (1 ￿ d)









(M + k ￿ 2)!(N ￿ k)!
￿
(1 ￿ d)
k￿N dN￿k(M + N ￿ 1)
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k)!
=
(1 ￿ d)
k￿N￿1 dN￿k(M + k ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ d)
k￿N dN￿k(M + N ￿ 1)
(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k)!
=
(1 ￿ d)
k￿N￿1 dN￿k+1(M + k ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ d)
k￿N dN￿k(N ￿ k)








(M + k ￿ 1)!(N ￿ k ￿ 1)!
for k = 1;:::;N ￿ 1, and
^ H(N) =
(1 ￿ d)￿1
(M + N ￿ 2)!
￿
1
(M + N ￿ 2)!
=
(1 ￿ d)￿1d






(M + k ￿ 2)!(N ￿ k)!
for k = 1;:::;N, and note that
^ H(k) = ^ J(k) ￿ ^ J(k + 1)
for k = 1;:::;N ￿ 1, and




^ H(k) = ^ J(1) =
(1 ￿ d)￿NdN
(M ￿ 1)!(N ￿ 1)!
:
The statement in the Lemma follows. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose ￿rst that O = 0 (the easier case). We have









(LA + LB ￿ 1)!




Integrating by parts we obtain
P (LA;LB) = 1 ￿














Proceeding iteratively we obtain, for O = 0,






￿LA+LB￿1 (LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA + k ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
:














(LA + LB + O ￿ 1)!
















LB￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1 dbda
￿
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LB￿2 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O db:









(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!





(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
(O + LB ￿ 1)!
(1 ￿ a)
O+LB￿1:











LB￿2 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O db:




LB￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1 db =
(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
(O + LB ￿ 1)!
(1 ￿ a)
O+LB￿1:
Substituting both inner integrals back in the previous expression for




(LA + LB + O ￿ 1)!












(LB ￿ k)!(O + k ￿ 1)!
da:
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which is equal to one because h0
LA;LB+O is a probability density with




LA+LB￿k￿1 (1 ￿ 2a)
O+k￿1 da =
2
O + k ￿ 1




LA+LB￿k (1 ￿ 2a)
O+k￿2 da:









￿LA+LB￿k (O + k ￿ 1)!(LA + LB ￿ k ￿ 1)!
(LA + LB + O ￿ 1)!
:
Thus, for O ￿ 1,






￿LA+LB￿k (LA + LB ￿ k ￿ 1)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
:
To show that the expressions for P (LA;LB) for the cases O = 0 and






￿LA+LB￿k (LA + LB ￿ k ￿ 1)!







￿LA+LB￿1 (LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA + k ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
:
This identity follows from Lemma A.1, letting M = LA, N = LB and
d = 1=2. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Using the de￿nition of PA(LA;LB) and Lemma 2,







￿LA+LB￿2 (LA + LB ￿ 2)!







￿LA+LB￿1 (LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA + k ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
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￿LA+LB￿2 (LA + LB ￿ 2)!







￿LA+LB￿1 (LA + LB ￿ 1)!




(LA + LB ￿ 2)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!
:
This identity follows from Lemma A.2, letting M = LA, N = LB and
d = 1=2. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. With respect to near single-peakedness, from
Lemma 3,
PA (LA + 1;LB)
PA (LA;LB)
=




PA (LA + 1;LB)
PA (LA;LB)
R 1 () LB R LA + 1:
With respect to symmetry, from the de￿nition of decisiveness,
PA(LA;LB) = PB(LB;LA);
and from Lemma 3,
PA(LA;LB) = PA(LB;LA):
￿
Proof of Lemma 5. Since parties A and B attract a fraction ￿ and ￿,
respectively, of the voters in the intervals corresponding to leaders for
A and for B, party B wins the election if ￿a is smaller than ￿b.
Suppose ￿rst that O = 0. In this case, B wins the election if a <
￿=(￿ + ￿). Thus
P (LA;LB) = 1 ￿
(LA + LB ￿ 1)!




LA￿1 (1 ￿ a)
LB￿1 da;
where ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿). Integrating by parts iteratively, as in the proof
of Lemma 2,
P (LA;LB) = 1 ￿
LB X
k=1
(LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA + k ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
(1 ￿ ￿)
LA+k￿1 ￿
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Now suppose that O ￿ 1. Note that B loses the election if b <
￿a=￿. Note also that b ￿ 1 ￿ a, and 1 ￿ a ￿ ￿a=￿ if and only if














(LA + LB + O ￿ 1)!




















Consider the inner integrals. Integrating by parts iteratively, as in the









(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
(LB ￿ k)!(O + k ￿ 1)!
(￿a=￿)
LB￿k(1 ￿ a ￿ ￿a=￿)
O+k￿1
+
(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
(O + LB ￿ 1)!
(1 ￿ a)
O+LB￿1:




LB￿1 (1 ￿ a ￿ b)
O￿1 db =
(LB ￿ 1)!(O ￿ 1)!
(O + LB ￿ 1)!
(1 ￿ a)
O+LB￿1:
Substituting both inner integrals back in the previous expression for
P (LA;LB), we get
P (LA;LB) = 1 ￿







(￿a=￿)LA+LB￿k￿1(1 ￿ a ￿ ￿a=￿)O+k￿1
(LB ￿ k)!(O + k ￿ 1)!
da:GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 30




LA+LB￿k￿1 (1 ￿ 2a)
O+k￿1 da =
(1 ￿ ￿)
LA+LB￿k (O + k ￿ 1)!(LA + LB ￿ k ￿ 1)!
(LA + LB + O ￿ 1)!
:
Thus, for O ￿ 1,
P (LA;LB) = 1 ￿
LB X
k=1
(LA + LB ￿ k ￿ 1)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
(1 ￿ ￿)
LA+LB￿k :
To show that the expressions for P (LA;LB) for the cases O = 0 and




LA+LB￿k (LA + LB ￿ k ￿ 1)!






LB￿k (LA + LB ￿ 1)!
(LA + k ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ k)!
:
This identity follows from Lemma A.1, letting M = LA, N = LB and
d = ￿.
Finally, using the de￿nition of PA(LA;LB) and one of the (equivalent)
expressions for P (LA;LB),




(LA + LB ￿ 2)!







(LA + LB ￿ 1)!




Thus, to prove the statement of the Lemma with respect to PA(LA;LB)
we need to verify the identity
LB X
k=1
(LA + LB ￿ 2)!







(LA + LB ￿ 1)!




= (1 ￿ ￿)
LA￿1 ￿
LB (LA + LB ￿ 2)!
(LA ￿ 1)!(LB ￿ 1)!
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This identity follows from Lemma A.1, letting M = LA, N = LB and
d = ￿. The proof of the statement with respect to PB(LA;LB) proceeds
along similar lines. ￿
















is positive and converges monotonically to zero as L goes to in￿nity,









(L ￿ 1)!(L ￿ 1)!
! 0







as c=G ! 0. Using the expressions for expected turnout and expected











as c=G ! 0, which is the approximation result for c=G stated in the
Corollary.
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as c=G ! 0. The approximation result for 1=O follows from this and
the expression for ET in Theorem 1. ￿GROUP FORMATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 33
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